Swimming Upstream: 
Grassroots perspectives on progress in interethnic relations since Dayton

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Abstract: In nearly 10 years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, scholars have highlighted the continued lack of interethnic cooperation among elites but have spent little time discussing patterns of interethnic relations at the grassroots level. Do ordinary people mirror the poor interethnic relations of political elites? Since the end of 1995, nation-wide surveys indicate that grassroots trends in attitudes about, and experiences with, those ethnically different have improved. These trends have occurred even among groups who have expressed the most ethnocentric attitudes though they do not extend to intimate interethnic mixing, indicating support for coexistence. Statistical analysis suggests that individuals who rarely attend religious services, live in urban areas, and are younger tend to express the most tolerance. A problem for transferring these positive trends at the grassroots level up to the level of politics is the Dayton political structure, which provides few incentives for political parties to frame concerns about the economy in an ethnically neutral, utilitarian way. Also, the preferences of ordinary people about the political configuration of Bosnia continue to widely differ by ethnic background. This paper ends by suggesting that further progress on interethnic relations requires attention to the interaction of social cleavages in Bosnia and to increasing the incentives in the political structure for interethnic accommodation among elites.

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1 Chapter in Tone Bringa, Asim Mujkic, and Hugo Stokke, eds., Accommodating Difference in Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years After Dayton, manuscript under review. This manuscript has benefited from comments made by participants at that workshop, Val Bunce, and from participants in the 2004 Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Boston, MA. I also appreciate the research assistance provided by Sladjana Dankovic and Allie Rosner. Please do not cite without permission.
Nearly 10 years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, political elites in Bosnia rarely engage in cross-ethnic cooperation or help ordinary citizens struggling to rebuild normal lives. While political elites appear locked into hostile interethnic relations, ordinary people have expressed and exhibited a decrease in hostile interethnic relations. These apparently divergent trends have occurred within a context of a very mixed record of progress toward achieving Dayton’s goal of rebuilding Bosnia into a viable multiethnic state. Scholars and practitioners have lavished attention on the interests of domestic and international elites at the expense of understanding grassroots processes. The views and behavior of elites are only one part of a complex web of factors that will help determine the reconstruction and ultimate viability and shape of Bosnia.

This paper turns the focus onto patterns of interethnic interaction among ordinary people. It first sketches the recent political developments and violence that shape grassroots experiences with and attitudes toward interethnic relations. Literature on interethnic relations in deeply divided societies suggests several sets of questions to ask in order to understand the evolution of citizens’ views on interethnic relations. First, how do ordinary citizens today evaluate interethnic relations in their communities, and how do they characterize their direct interethnic experiences? Second, has there been any change in the level of ethnocentrism? Third, what factors help explain continued ethnocentrism? Finally, what are grassroots perspectives on the preferred configuration of Bosnia? Analysis of data from multiple surveys and from interviews and participant observation I conducted off and on since 1996 helps address these questions. This paper ends by suggesting steps to improve interethnic relations at the grassroots level in Bosnia and by identifying issues for further research.

The context

Throughout Bosnia's history, multiple social cleavages—sometimes overlapping—have influenced social relations. Prominent social divisions until the late 19th century were class, urban-rural, and religion; ethnic differences, which were largely rooted in religious tradition and practice, were not politicized until the late 19th century (Donia and Fine 1994, p. 84). Since then, Bosnia's three ethnonational groups have possessed “contradictory traditions of conflict and accommodation” (Burg 1983b; Burg and Shoup 1999, ch 2). To cultivate communal cooperation, Yugoslav elites used modernization, economic experimentation, balancing, control,
and socialization (Shoup 1968; Bertsch 1976; Schopflin 1993; Bringa 1995, ch. 1). Modernization contributed both to ethnically mixed marriages in many cities and to interethnic competition (Hodson, Sekulic, Massey 1994). Furthermore, beyond intermixed urban areas, Bosnia offered two other paradigms for mixing that are rooted in pre-socialist tradition (Bringa 2000). The second was “living side-by-side,” which occurred in some mixed villages in central Bosnia, where most neighborhoods were separate and there was little intermarriage, but there still was quite a bit of interethnic interaction. The third paradigm is rooted in hamlets, where small ethnically homogeneous communities often harbored resentment toward urbanites and coexisted with minimal interethnic contact and ethnocentrism (Lockwood 1975, pp. 197-8; Pantic 1991, p. 176).

In socialist Yugoslavia, people constructed a sense of who they were and what it meant to be, for example, a Croat, based on their experiences and their interactions with neighboring groups and official categories (Bringa 1995, Ch. 1). Ethnic distance increased between 1966 and 1990, as did conflicts among regional elite for power (Bertsch 1976; Pantic 1991, pp. 171-84; Šiber 1997). In an atmosphere of crumbling socialist legitimacy, regional devolution (Ramet 1993; Bunce 1998), elite competition (Gagnon 1994/5; Cohen 1995), economic decline and mass frustration (Lampe 2000) elites propagated a “crisis” frame that depicted interethnic relations as hostile, a frame that had been dormant since WWII, to replace the “normal” frame of positive interethnic relations that dominated during the socialist period (Obserschall 2000). Western governments exacerbated these tensions by responding inconsistently to sovereignty claims (Woodward 1995, chs. 6, 7, 10; Burg and Shoup 1999, chs 3-8; Bose 2002, p. 161-5). With the leaders of Bosnia's national communities unwilling to compromise and Serbia and Croatia militarily assisting their ethnic kin, (Magaš and Zanić 2001; part II) elements of Bosnia's Serb and Croat communities fought to partition the state between 1992 and 1995. Extremists targeted sites of interethnic cooperation. Particularly in rural areas, extremists often compelled neighbors into “preemptively” turning on neighbors (Bougarel 1996; Halpern and Kideckel 2000). In the

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2 Simić conceptualizes modernization as a multifaceted process involving urbanization and an increase in scale, complexity, and efficiency of technology and production, as well as a change in social structure, culture, and world view (1983, p. 204). Change may occur at a different rate or not at all in each of modernization's areas.

3 Personal communication, Washington DC, January 2000.
aftermath of war, surveys reveal ethnicity, urban-rural heritage, and war experience as the most prominent social cleavages (Dani 1999).

The political institutions that the “international community” imposed on Bosnia send mixed signals about interethnic cooperation, which negatively influence grassroots views on interethnic relations. Although the Dayton constitution supports interethnic cooperation, for example, by encouraging the unprecedented right of refugees to return to their very homes, it also reinforces divisions among Bosnia's three constituent nations. It institutionalizes ethnonational cleavages—Bosniak, Serb, and Croat—in a tri-ethnic collective presidency, ethnic-based federalism (the Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska), mutual veto, and ethnic keys in the bureaucracy and state-owned companies. The constitution and electoral rules bolster the power of monoethnic parties (Bose 2002), who work to thwart multiethnic governance and favor the local majority group in power (Cox 1997; Ombudsmen of the Federation 1998; Stubbs 1999; Burg and Shoup 1999, pp. 367-73).

Bosnians experienced a horrific war that displaced more than half of the population, left perhaps 200,000 dead, and devastated much of the social and physical infrastructure. While Bosnia's population remains largely ethnically divided and approximately 400,000 displaced persons remain without a durable solution, international pressure has helped more than 1 million return, at least temporarily (UNHCR 2004). Flouting early skeptics, a significant portion of these returnees 400,000 have been “minorities,” or persons belonging to ethnic groups other than the dominant group in a locality. The rebuilding of postwar societies, including those in Lebanon and in the US after the civil war, suggests that ten years should bring about only modest progress in inter-communal relations. In Bosnia, this process is complicated by covetous neighbors; the failure to capture top leaders indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; nationalist leaders’ use of political institutions, the economy, schools, media to reinforce ethnic divisions; the unprecedented effort by a multitude of international organizations to reconstruct the country; and a dismal economy.

\[4\] Many of the individuals whom these elites would characterize as minorities do not identify as minorities. Bringa (1995) and Woodward (1995) believe that international officials’ categorization of individuals in Bosnia either by ethnicity or as a “majority” or “minority” has contributed to the conflict.

\[5\] The estimated unemployment rate in Bosnia in 2003 was 40 percent (CIA 2003).
Literature

Scholars’ explanations for the war in Bosnia affect their expectations of factors that influence interethnic relations after the war. Oberschall’s (2000) explanation of elite evocation of a “crisis frame” of hostile interethnic relations ties improvement in interethnic relations to whether domestic elites, alone or under pressure from internationals, have muted or ceased use of the crisis frame. Fear of those ethnically different is an essential mechanism for promoting the crisis frame. Content analysis of electoral campaign rhetoric captured by local media and public opinion on the character of interethnic relations in postwar Bosnia will help answer this question.

Given the lack of political will among Bosnia’s elite to promote interethnic cooperation, any progress on interethnic relations at the grassroots levels is probably the result of either international efforts or bottom-up processes. While international programs can create space for interethnic interaction, indigenous forces will ultimately determine what impact those international initiatives will exert upon grassroots interethnic relations. One such force capable of promoting cross-communal cooperation can arise out of repeated, mutually dependent interaction among individuals from different groups. This interaction helps build trust, even if the initial interaction is mistrustful and the relationship remains acquaintance-based (Seligman 1997). Even where no effective authorities promote it, cooperation can emerge if individuals rely on reciprocity (Axelrod 1981, p. 69). As a result, data on individuals’ concrete experiences with those ethnically different reveal information on the character of direct interethnic interaction. Furthermore, citizens’ engagement in ethnically mixed non-governmental organizations that promote social capital that bridge ethnic divides should improve interethnic relations (Putnam 2000, p. 19; Varshney 2001). Data on interethnic interaction and participation in ethnically inclusive non-governmental organizations will help determine if bridging social capital is generated and if it works to improve interethnic relations in Bosnia.

Theory on grassroots developments in deeply divided post-conflict societies has pointed out the importance of reducing levels of ethnic intolerance in order to contribute to the stability and democratization of the state (Gibson and Gouws 2000). Have levels of ethnocentrism decreased since Dayton? Data on social distance will help gauge levels of ethnic intolerance.

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6 The logic of Seligman and Axelrod differs from scholars who view the violence in Bosnia as stemming from a security dilemma, (see Bose 2002, pp. 174-80) in which lack of an impartial central state to protect citizens means that no ethnic group can protect itself without threatening the security of other groups. Literature on the security dilemma as applied to deeply ethnically divided states believes that in lieu of an impartial central state, only ethnic partition will solve the security dilemma.
Social distance is a concept that attempts to capture the tension that exists along the most salient social division in a society (Pantic 1991). Particularly in the wake of violence designed to elevate the significance of ethnicity, this social cleavage in Bosnia is ethnicity. Indicators of social distance encompass ranges of intimacy, from the least intimate, such as willingness to coexist in the same state, to the most intimate, the willingness to marry someone of another ethnic background.

Experiments have shown that intense attachment to a narrow social identity, such as ethnic identity, can contribute to intolerance toward other ethnic groups (Tajfel 1978). Progress in cultivating a supra-communal loyalty, on the other hand, is theorized to reduce intolerance and contribute to the stability of a multiethnic state (Haddad 2002). Statistical analysis of World Values Survey data will test whether factors like exclusive social identification predict intolerance. Intense attachment to communal loyalties also elevates polarizing issues, such as protection of a particular ethnonational group, to a dominant position among political concerns. This process reinforces division. Have Bosnians over time moved away from using ethnic lenses to interpret political concerns? Final critical questions are whether Bosnians have come closer together in agreeing about the possibility of living together peacefully and about a desired political configuration for Bosnia.

Analysis of data on these questions should help evaluate whether ethnic relations in Bosnia have improved since the signing of Dayton and what factors exert a positive influence on both the lives of ordinary people and the stability of the country. It will also inform studies of grassroots processes in other post-conflict states faced with elite obstruction to integration.

**Approach and Method**

Scholarship on ethnic conflict management in the Balkans has overlooked the influence of ordinary people to focus on the critical roles that international and domestic elites have played in manipulating ethnic relations (Cohen 1995, Woodward 1995, Burg and Shoup 1999; Hayden 1999; Chandler 2000; Bose 2002; Gagnon 2004). For example, Gagnon (2004, Ch. 1) argues that the behavior of ordinary people in Bosnia can only be understood as a reaction to an environment constructed by those who control the institutions of force and persuasion. Because

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7 Tajfel (1978, p. 63) defines social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”
elites severely constrain grassroots choices, they have captured the attention of scholars, practitioners, and media.

Others take an even more pessimistic view about the role of ordinary individuals, painting Bosnians as cursed with a “subject” political culture, in which citizens sit around and wait for whatever political leaders dish out (Milivojević 1994). Certainly, segments of the Bosnian population participate little in organized social and political life (Pickering, forthcoming). But there is also evidence that a more participatory political culture, including among rural inhabitants, exists. One example is the series of spontaneous returns that occurred in Bosnia in 1999 and 2000, when displaced persons got fed up with obstreperous political leaders on all sides and hesitant international organizations obstructing their return. So they got up and went home on their own. Another largely grassroots initiative was the successful movement to directly elect mayors. Grassroots movements against repressive and corrupt post-communist governments who hijacked elections in nearby Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate the possibility for alienated post-communist citizens to mobilize themselves to push for regime change (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005).

Another reason that scholars focus on elites and not the public is the fact that public opinion data gathered just before the war indicate that interethnic relations at the grassroots level were not bad, and were thus not the root of the problem. According to a 1990 poll, most citizens of Yugoslavia characterized ethnic relations as good or satisfactory in their neighborhoods (88 percent) and in their workplaces (64 percent) (Yugoslav Survey 1990, p. 25). Indeed, the empirical record strongly shows that grassroots interethnic relations were not the root of the violence. Even if ordinary people are more often the targets than the initiators of violence, it is important to understand their varying susceptibility to mobilization by chauvinistic elites. Differences in vulnerability to elite manipulation are suggested by local variation in the levels of interethnic violence in Bosnia (Burg and Shoup 1999, ch. 4), Kosovo (International Crisis Group 2004), India (Varshney 2001; Wilkinson 2004) and Rwanda (Bhavnani and Backer 2000).

Recent grassroots initiatives in the post-communist region and variations in violence and ethnocentrism in former Yugoslavia call for more thought about the role of ordinary people on the rebuilding process in Bosnia. Those scholars who have dug below the surface of national-

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8 Interview with official from USAID’s Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, June 23, 2004.
level politicians and institutions have settled on local activists as their focus (Cockburn 1998; DeMichelis 1998, Gagnon 2002, Dahlman and Toal 2004). These efforts have increased understanding of the complex and nuanced dynamics of interethnic interaction among local elites in Bosnia. Research on elites, their policies, and their mechanisms for coercion is important in understanding why Bosnia remains divided and in exposing the tremendous obstacles to rebuilding positive interethnic relations in Bosnia and other post-conflict areas face. But this is only part of the story of reconstruction. Ordinary people also interpret and react to elite rhetoric and policies based partly on their sense of who they are and their social experiences (Walsh 2004). More attention needs to be paid to grassroots processes. My research on ordinary people is intended to compliment research focused on elites.

I analyze quantitative data collected by scholars involved in the World Values Survey (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 1997 and 2004), and those commissioned by the US Department of State (1998; Bell 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Bell and Smeltz 2001; Demeri 2001; Sweeney 1999a, 1999b, 2001) the UN Development Programme (2000-2005) and the World Bank (Dani 1999; Poggi 2002). These survey data allow for generalization, but not for understanding the various meanings that respondents may have given to identical response categories or to the role of context. The qualitative data that I gathered through intensive interviews and participant observation are better suited for those tasks. I lived with six local families in apartment buildings that housed residents with a mix of social backgrounds and observed their everyday social interactions for 14 months in 1999, 2002, and 2004. I combined observation of these families and a total of 130 informants, with 52 in-depth

9 For a discussion of the methodology of these surveys, see: http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.shtml.

10 These data are based on face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of 944 Bosnian Serbs, 921 Bosniaks, and 939 Bosnian Croats in their respective areas of domination in Bosnia. This sampling under represents local minorities. The margin of error is +/- four percentage points (Sweeney 1999)

11 Similar to the surveys commissioned by the State Department, those commissioned by the UN Development Programme conduct interviews from random samples of 500 persons in each of the three “ethnic majority areas.” Unlike the State Department surveys, these surveys add a total of 450 interviews with local minorities. See the UN Development Programme’s (2003, pp. 56-62) public opinion poll methodological report.

12 Appendices of these reports provide a discussion of survey methodology.

13 Lack of a postwar census also complicates survey research design.
interviews. Combining different sources and types of data, as well as employing multiple techniques for analyzing data, is crucial for increasing confidence in findings on grassroots attitudes.

**Findings**

Despite the fact that elites continue to employ the crisis frame of hostile interethnic relations, grassroots perspectives on interethnic relations in general have improved since the signing of Dayton. Each ethnic group, however, continues to express distinct views about the nature of, and prospects for, interethnic cooperation. For example, Serbs in the Republika Srpska (RS) seem more resigned now than at the signing of Dayton to coexisting with returnees of another ethnicity even though they still express the most ethnocentric views. Statistical analysis identifies forces that contribute to ethnocentrism. Views that are more explicitly political indicate less convergence. Bosnian Serbs and Croats still believe that the protection of ethnonational interests should be a high priority of politicians. Ominously for the future, there remains no consensus about the preferred shape of Bosnia.

*The Crisis Frame and Interethnic Relations.* To help gauge the extent to which political elites continue to employ the crisis frame of interethnic relations, I conducted content analysis of randomly selected articles from local coverage of Bosnia’s 2002 election campaign. Systematic analysis aided by a qualitative database software program (Scholari 1997) revealed that the election campaign was dominated –57 percent of the messages– by the crisis frame, which involved messages about protecting ethnic group interests, ethnic identity, and the threat posed by other ethnic groups and disloyal co-ethnics inside and outside the state. These ethnically divisive themes ate up 57 percent of campaign messages, trumping messages about utilitarian issues, such as corruption (12 percent) and economic problems (11 percent).15

Continued use of the crisis frame of interethnic relations hinders the recovery of interethnic relations. Only 22 percent in Serb dominated areas to 43 percent in Bosniak-dominated areas believe that progress toward reconciliation has been made since Dayton (UN Development Programme 2000). Moving from state-wide interethnic dynamics to local

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14 I used snowball sampling to locate individuals for interviewing.

15 The number of campaign messages was 244 (Pickering 2005).
interethnic dynamics reveals more positive attitudes. While strong majorities of Bosniaks and Croats evaluate interethnic relations in their towns or villages as good, more Serbs evaluate interethnic relations as bad than good (Table 1). The Serbs’ significantly lower evaluation of interethnic relations reflects their greater pessimism about interethnic cooperation, which is reinforced by political rhetoric in favor of separation in the RS and mistrust of international intervention.

Table 1: Views on interethnic relations in one’s own locality in Bosnia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnian Serbs in Serb-dominated areas</th>
<th>Bosnian Croats in Croat-dominated areas</th>
<th>Bosniaks in Bosniak-dominated areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Demeri 2001
N=1500; Columns do not add up to 100%, because of “don’t knows.”

The split in attitudes among Serbs living in the RS present a continuing obstacle to efforts toward coexistence. The largely positive attitudes toward relations with persons of another ethnicity in the Federation should bolster support for coexistence there.

Another indication of improved grassroots willingness to coexist is the increase in support for minority returns, one of the most contentious aspects of Dayton. Between 1995 and 2003, citizens of all backgrounds and all areas of residence have increased their support for the return of refugees of another ethnicity to their towns (Appendix B (Excel file) Graphs 1). Unfortunately, different data sources and sampling techniques prevent examination of trends over the full 10 years. The most dramatic change has occurred among inhabitants in the area most opposed to minority return – the RS. Between December 1995 and December 1999 Bosnian Serbs from Serb-dominated areas significantly increased their support for minority return from 18 percent to 42 percent (USIA 1998; Demeri 2001). From February 2001 to __________

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16 This mirrors the prewar trend in the former Yugoslav area. See Pantić 1991.

17 The source of data from 1995 to 1999 is the US Department of State, who reports views by ethnicity in each of the three ethnically predominant areas. These surveys asked “How do you feel about refugees from another nationality group returning to your city/town/village?” “Support” includes those who responded that they strongly or somewhat supported return. The source of data form 2000-December 2004 is the UNDP, who reports views by ethnically predominant areas and does not specify ethnic background. Furthermore, UNDP’s sample of 650 in each ethnically predominant area contains 150 minorities. These surveys report those who responded “I mostly or strongly agree that people coming form the minority population who lived in this municipality before the war should return to their homes.”
December 2004, inhabitants of Serb-dominated areas—both Serbs and minorities—increased the support from 69.4 percent to 77.5 percent (UNDP 2000-2004). This shift in public support for minority return suggests surprisingly widespread acceptance of the idea of return. Many returnees proudly proclaim, “svak na svoj” (each in his/her own home). The concrete experiences of one of the most vulnerable social groups in Bosnia—minorities—suggests that attitudes supportive of minority return are put into practice. Between 2001 and the end of 2003, a remarkably high percentage of minorities (from 86.6 percent in Serb-dominated territory to 94.6 percent in Bosniak-dominated territory) did not experience a verbal or physical abuse in the past year (UNDP 2001-2003) (Graph 2).

Social Distance. Though interpersonal trust in Bosnia remains low, citizens overtime have generally decreased their distance from those ethnically different. Because of the intimacy that intermarriage requires, support for marrying someone of a different ethnicity should be lower than support for living next to a neighbor of a different ethnicity and certainly than merely living in the same country as someone of another ethnicity. Data collected by the UN Development Programme confirm this, with Bosnians of all backgrounds exhibiting low levels of willingness to marry someone of a different ethnicity, from 3.2 percent (respondents in predominantly Croat areas willing to have a family member marry a Serb in 2000) to 38.5 percent (respondents in predominantly Bosniak areas willing to have a family member marry a Croat in 2003) (Graphs 3). In contrast, by 2003, individuals are much more willing to live in the same country with different ethnic groups, ranging from 63 percent (respondents in predominantly Serb areas willing to share the country with Bosniaks) to 87 percent (respondents in predominantly Bosniak areas willing to share the country with Croats). These views indicate a rejection of multiculturalism but an acceptance of coexistence, which makes sense less than 10 years after the end of the war and in light of the advice of religious and many political officials.

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18 To reiterate, these UNDP surveys do not report views on minority return by ethnicity. However, even if we assume that all 150 minorities of the 650 respondents in each ethnically predominant area support minority return and subtract them from the sample, then the lowest percentage of Serbs from the RS supportive of minority return is 46.4 percent in February 2001 to 54.5 percent in 2004.

19 Because of their potential vulnerability, minorities may under-report security incidents (UNHCR 2005).

20 As social distance theory suggests, support for a moderately intimate level of mixing, such as intermingling in schools, is higher, ranging from 58 percent of respondents in predominantly Serb areas to 84 percent of respondents in predominantly Bosniak areas (UNDP 2003, pp. 49-50).
Respondents between 1997 and 2001 increased their willingness to engage in a moderately close level of intermixing, as measured by openness to sharing the same neighborhood with someone of another background. Specifically, they decreased objections to living next to someone of another religion (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004) (Table 2).\textsuperscript{21} This pattern holds in both entities and among all the ethnic groups.

\textbf{Table 2: Decrease in intolerance}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who mentioned that they would not live next to a neighbor of another religion 1997</th>
<th>% who mentioned that they would not live next to a neighbor of another religion 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Bosnia as a whole:</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Federation</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the RS</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority group (Bosniaks)</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1189 for 1997
N=694 for 2001

Attitudes about neighbors, however, systematically vary according to ethnic background and region.\textsuperscript{22} Data collected later by the UN Development Programme indicates that the relatively high tolerance of neighbors of Serb background decreased between 2000-2003 in Bosniak-majority areas, from 81.4 to 74.4 (Graphs 3). This pattern may reflect increased tensions partly as a result of the spike in number of minority returns to their prewar homes in predominantly Bosniak areas between 2000 and 2002 (UNDP 2002).\textsuperscript{23} Factors contributing to this downward blip deserve further attention.

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\textsuperscript{21} The World Values Survey does not ask about willingness to live next to someone of a different ethnicity. Religion is the next closest salient social division that it asks about.

\textsuperscript{22} F tests show statistically significant differences at the .001 level among the views of respondents of different ethnicity, as well as among inhabitants of different entities.

\textsuperscript{23} In 2002, the estimated number of minority returns was 49,050 to the Bosniak-Croat Federation (most to predominantly Bosniak areas) and 34,740 to the RS (UNDP 2002, p. 50). Furthermore, more returnees were Serb than Croat.
These survey data can distinguish only broad differences in patterns in interethnic relations. These data indicate, not surprisingly, that interethnic relations are better in the Federation than in RS. They, however, cannot convey what Dahlman and Toal (2004) call the local geopolitics that minorities face. For example, in mixed villages where ethnic cleansing occurred, minority returnees tend to live separately from, and largely refrain from interacting, with their pre-war neighbors of another ethnic group and displaced persons interested in permanently relocating there. In contrast, minority returnees to Sarajevo, which experienced less intimate violence, often regularly interact with Bosniaks and other Sarajevans in their apartment building, schools, and jobs.

Even in areas of tense interethnic relations, ordinary people —particularly local minorities— have adopted strategies of dealing with the reality that everyday life often involves interethnic interaction. These strategies include efforts to construct interethnic agreement on those to blame for Bosnia’s sad state of affairs, including “primitive” rural persons now displaced into towns and “dirty” politicians (Cockburn 1998; Pickering 2001; Kollind 2005). Many (73 percent of) Bosnians believe that political parties are obstructing better interethnic relations (UNDP 2005). In Banja Luka, persons have created space for interethnic interaction by refraining from discussing contentious issues (Stefansson 2005). Also, working not only empowers individuals and promotes healing (Bell 2005), it can also provide the possibility for Bosnians to engage in sustained and purposeful interethnic interaction that can build trust (Pickering, forthcoming). Ordinary Bosnians express the greatest support for interaction with people of another ethnic background in the workplace. For example, from 65 percent to 85 percent of Bosnians are willing to work with a colleague of another ethnicity (UNDP 2003). An average of 79 percent of Bosnians would be willing to work in a private firm owned by someone of another ethnicity (OSCE 2003, p. 84). Nationalist parties’ control over the economy through patronage, however, prevents many ordinary people from acting upon their willingness to share the workplace with others.

Identifying factors that contribute to intolerance would help scholars and practitioners understand obstacles to return and reintegration. Because altering the incentives within Bosnian political institutions to better promote elite-level interethnic cooperation would undoubtedly be tough, building on progress toward coexistence at the grassroots level may be a more fruitful approach to breaking the logjam. The attitudes of members who belong to the majority group
have important implications for coexistence. Local minorities express significantly more tolerant attitudes toward difference. For instance, Serbs in the Federation exhibit less ethnocentrism than Serbs in Republika Srpska. Local minorities live in a heterogeneous context, which means that they will have to deal with more interethnic interaction than members of the majority group. In addition, survey data from the US State Department confirm the expectation that minority returnees are more politically moderate than members who belong to the majority group (Sweeney 2001).

Because attitudes of individuals belonging to the majority group in each of the three ethnically dominated areas of Bosnia play a large role in influencing interethnic relations, they deserve special attention. Those data available, however, do not provide enough information to identify which respondents live in Croat-dominated areas of the Federation, and which live in Bosniak-dominated areas of the Federation. As a result, I focus on explaining intolerance of those culturally different only among those groups that dominate each entity - Bosniaks in the Federation and Serbs in the RS. To isolate factors, I constructed several statistical models to test the individual effect of each potential factor on religious intolerance among Bosnians (Table 3).

These models include the most common individual-level determinant for social capital, involvement in non-hierarchical NGOs. Involvement in these NGOs, if they are ethnically mixed, should decrease intolerance. They also investigate the role of opinions and behavior important in deeply divided post-communist states. Higher levels of attendance at religious services should contribute to intolerance, given the divisive role that most—though not all—religious leaders have played in the Balkans (Cohen 1997). Views about the past communist

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25 To isolate factors that influence attitudes people of different backgrounds, I need individual-level data. Only the World Values Survey provides data collected on individual respondents. While the survey did record information in which entity respondents resided, it did not identify the municipality (opcina) in which they reside. Thus I cannot tell from the World Values Survey data which respondents in the Federation live in predominantly Croat areas and which live in predominantly Bosniak areas.

26 My statistical models are logistic regression models, because my dependent variable (the phenomenon to be explained) is dichotomous: mention of unwillingness to live next to a neighbor of a different religion (coded as 1) or no mention of unwillingness to live next to a neighbor of a different religion.

27 The non-hierarchical criterion for NGOs that generate social capital means that I have eliminated religious organizations from this category. In doing so, I follow Dowley and Silver (2002). I test separately the impact of membership in religious organizations.
system in the context of Yugoslavia may also be connected to, among other things, support for communist rulers’ less ethnocentric policies. According to social identity theory (Tajfel 1978), expressing a civic-based identity over an ethnic-based one should also decrease intolerance. I have also controlled for demographic and socio-economic factors.

### Table 3: Explaining religious intolerance among majority groups in Bosnia’s entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model I: Bosniaks in the Federation</th>
<th>Model II: Serbs in the RS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member NGO (not religious)</td>
<td>-.552</td>
<td>(.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive view of communist system</td>
<td>-.097</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supra-ethnic civic identification</td>
<td>.634</td>
<td>(.397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOGRAPHICS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age cohort</td>
<td>.320*</td>
<td>(.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban resident</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>(.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>(.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>(.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>(.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>(.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.445</td>
<td>(1.616)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004
For the Federation: N = 400; For the Republika Srpska: N=161
* = significant at the .05 level; **=significant at the .01 level;
Log Likelihood (Federation) -104.429; Log Likelihood (Bosnia’s RS) -79.710
Probability > $\chi^2$.05 (Bosnia's Federation); Probability > $\chi^2$.05 (RS)
Pseudo R$^2$: .083 (Federation); Pseudo R$^2$: .171 (RS)
Percent of responses on social distance correctly predicted: 91.5% in the Federation; 78 % in the RS

Several interesting things jump out from these models. Model 1, which explains religious intolerance among Bosniaks in the Federation, identifies only one factor as statistically significant (as indicated by the asterisks) – age. Somewhat surprisingly, older Bosniaks in the Federation express more intolerance than younger Bosniaks in the Federation. Interpreting the

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28 For coding of variables, see Appendix A.
statistical results in Table 3, the probability that an individual between 18 and 24 years old expresses intolerance is .03, while the probability that an individual who is 65 years or older expresses intolerance is .20. Literature on political socialization (Jennings and Niemi 1981) would expect that those who were in their formative years during particularly tense times (for example, WWII or the 1992-5 war) would be more likely to have been socialized into intolerant attitudes. What is interesting is that none of the 74 respondents in the 18-24 age group, a group that would have been in their formative years during the most recent war, was willing to object to living next to someone of a different religion. An optimistic interpretation of this is that Bosniak youth have learned the folly of ethnocentrism. Many youth I talked with expressed anger that self-interested politicians led them into a war that became a “black hole” that swallowed up their lives and ruined their futures.

Model II, which explains intolerance among Serbs in the RS, identifies several different factors as significant, illustrating the divergent social and political dynamics in the entities. The first is church attendance. The probability that an individual who rarely attends church expresses intolerance = .13, whereas the probability that an individual who attends church once a week expresses intolerance is .36. This would conform to expectations that the more the exposure to the divisive rhetoric that dominates the religious hierarchy the more ethnically intolerant individuals will be. Why attending religious services foments intolerance among Serbs in the RS and not among Bosniaks in the Federation is an issue that deserves further research. It is certainly not because the Bosniak religious leadership is preaching tolerance, as rhetoric during the October 2004 local elections in Bosnia demonstrated (Moore 2004). Bosniaks in the Federation attend religious services less often than Serbs in the RS. About 47 percent of Serbs in the RS and 41 percent of Bosniaks in the Federation attend religious services at least once a month, while 7 percent of Serbs in the RS and 18 percent of Bosniaks in the Federation almost

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29 In logistic regression, the effect of a variable depends on where in the logistic curve we are evaluating the effect. This is because the effect depends on the values of all other independent (or explanatory) variables. In interpreting the effect of the statistically significant factors, such as age cohort on intolerance, I selected a value for the significant independent variable of interest and kept other variables at their means.

30 A less sanguine interpretation of this relationship is that youth are more politically savvy, and thus keen to downplay stereotypes and generate answers that they believe are socially desirable. The attitudes of youth on tolerance deserve further investigation.
never attend religious services (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004).

The second factor that is significant is the respondent’s residence in an urban environment. Contrast the probability that an individual who lives in a town between 10-20,000 expresses intolerance --.22, with the probability that an individual who lives in a village with less than 2000 inhabitants expresses intolerance --.37. Individuals who live in urban environments tend to more often mix with those of different ethnicities, than do those in more rural environments. This process can work to break down stereotypes and slowly build trust (Kunovich and Hodson 2002). What is surprising is that this process appears to prevail even in a situation of intense competition over scarce resources, such as jobs and housing. The fact that minorities tend to live in particular neighborhoods within towns in the RS and that minorities still make up a relatively small percentage of the urban population in the RS may temper competition. One reason that urban environments do not appear to influence significantly ethnic distance among Bosniaks in the Federation is that forced displacement of Bosniaks—particularly from rural areas of Republika Srpska—compelled many of them to relocate to more urban areas of the Federation. While an increasing number of Bosniaks who were displaced have returned home, others have decided to stay permanently in urban areas. Many of these “new urbanites,” however, would have spent the bulk of their most formative years in rural settings, thus absorbing more ethnocentric views. Also, these “new urbanities” are more likely to have directly suffered violence than Bosniaks who spent the war in more urban areas. Interviews I conducted with urbanites in Bosniak-dominated towns indicated deep divisions—regardless of ethnicity—between long-term urbanites and newcomers from the countryside (Pickering 2003). The tensest relations are often between minority returnees and Bosniak newcomers who fled rural areas; these groups often directly compete for scarce jobs and housing.

Also interesting are the factors that the models did not find significant. Membership in NGOs does not facilitate the development of more tolerant attitudes. This is probably due to a combination of factors, including the ethnically homogeneous nature of many NGOs in Bosnia (Poggi 2002) and the lack of roots that many of them have in Bosnian society (Pickering, 31 Urban areas in the RS like Banja Luka also have an influx of persons displaced from rural areas. However, many of the displaced are refugees from Croatia’s Krajina. These refugees do not have citizenship in Bosnia, and thus were probably excluded from the survey sample.}
forthcoming). Most economic factors are in the anticipated direction, such as respondents with lower incomes or no employment are more likely to express intolerance, but they fail to reach the accepted levels of statistical significance. One explanation for the uneven behavior of unemployment may be the high levels of participation in “ unofficial” or black market work, particularly in the RS. Civic identification (as foremost a citizen of Bosnia) also has no impact. This is not surprising given that supra-ethnic identification as foremost a citizen of Bosnia has only taken hold among Bosniaks, which undermines its civic notion. In my interviews, many Bosnian Serbs and Croats conflated the concepts of Bosnian (a regional identity) and Bosniak (an ethnic identity). This demonstrates deep attachment to ethnic identity, particularly among inhabitants of Croat and Serb-dominated areas. Bosniaks’ antipathy toward interethnic marriage also conveys strong attachment to ethnic identity. Education does not have a significant impact, which is consistent with research on education and tolerance since the 1980s, when nationalists gained greater hold over the education process (Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey 1994; Donia 2000).

In sum, the statistical models suggest several key obstacles to breaking down ethnocentric views. Among Bosniaks in the Federation, the attitudes of the older Bosniaks population reveal ethnocentrism. Domestic and international practitioners should reach out to this segment of the population. The positive aspect of this finding is that Bosniak youth in the Federation are more tolerant. The ultimate impact of the tolerance of the youngest generation in the Federation is tempered by their high levels of disaffection. Youth are less likely than other age cohorts to vote (OSCE 2004) and are more willing (as many as 65 percent) to consider leaving Bosnia if they had the opportunity (UNDP 2003). International community should focus on raising their level of political efficacy and creating economic opportunities. The fact that youth in the RS are just as ethnocentric as older generations suggests that the international community’s initial strategy of isolating the RS and withholding assistance for non-compliance with Dayton (Woodward 1999) has failed to break down ethnocentrism among the Serb population there. In comparison with young Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation, young Serbs in the RS have fewer opportunities to interact with international humanitarians, travel abroad,
and find employment. This suggests that deeper engagement of the international community in the RS would be a better strategy of promoting grassroots change.\(^{32}\)

**Political Concerns.** Between 1998 and 2001, Bosnians of all backgrounds increased their belief that the most important priority for the government should be solving economic problems.\(^{33}\) They furthermore agreed that the obstacles to economic progress centered on flawed privatization, corrupt politicians who are unwilling to advance concrete programs for economic growth, and lack of foreign investment (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance January and March 2001). In theory, the increasing concern about the economy and agreement about the reasons for economic problems should create even better conditions for grassroots support of parties committed to addressing these concerns. The ethnic party system (Horowitz 1985), patronage (Woodward 1999), and the top-down nature of political parties in South Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig 2002), however, seriously undermine prospects for detaching economic concerns from mono-ethnic parties. Furthermore, youth, who have expressed the most progressive views, have abstained from voting in larger percentages than older age cohorts (OSCE Democratization Department 2004).\(^{34}\) Lurking below concern for the economy is concern for a problem guaranteed to generate ethnic polarization: concern for the defense of ethnonational rights.\(^{35}\) This allows for elites to twist general disgruntlement with economic scarcity into anger toward “other” ethnonational groups.

All these factors help explain why Bosnians have cast their votes most consistently for ethnonationalist parties. Even in the most recent elections in 2004, where voters selected municipal councils and mayors; only in the RS did moderate forces make gains (Izborna

\(^{32}\) This discussion of the tolerance of youth in Bosnia has benefited from the comments of Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich.

\(^{33}\) In 2001, those identifying “work to improve the economy and promote new jobs” as the highest priority for the government, included 52% of Serbs (Bell 2001b) 47% of Croats (Bell 2001a) and 74% of Bosniaks (Bell 2001c). Respondents were allowed several choices.

\(^{34}\) When asked in May 2004 whether they intended to vote in the municipal elections in October 2004, 45.6 percent of respondents in the 18-25 age group said they would not, while only 30.7 percent of the 26-35 age group, 32 percent of the 36-50 age group and 26 percent of the 51 and older age group said they would not (OSCE Democratization Department 2004)

\(^{35}\) Those believing in 2001 that the most important priority for the government should be “working to defend the rights of people of our own [ethnic-based] nationality, included 22% of Serbs (Bell 2001b) and 28 % of Croats (Bell 2001a), though only 2 % of Bosniaks (Bell 2001c). The remained the second highest concern for Bosnian Serbs and Croats, the groups most dissatisfied with Dayton.
Komisija 2004). Moreover, many in Bosnia agree with the proposition that “only national parties or parties with national prefixes can ensure the protection of vital national interests of the people they represent.” Fifty percent of Croats in Croat-majority areas agree with this proposition, while 39 percent of Serbs in the RS and 31 percent of Bosniaks concur (UN Development Programme 2003, p. 47).

Even within a deeply divided country, Bosnians have increased their belief that ultimately Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs can live peacefully together (Table 4).

**Table 4: Increase in Belief that Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks will be able to Live Peacefully Together**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% who believed that Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims will be able to live peacefully together in 1995</th>
<th>% who believed that Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims will be able to live peacefully together in 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sweeney 1999b, Demeri 2001

Citizens also increasingly see peacekeeping forces as essential for a stable peace. The percentage of those most concerned that the withdrawal of peacekeepers would lead to war decreased from a high of 48 percent in May 2000 to 24.5 percent in March 2005 (UNDP 2000-2005). There remains no consensus, however, about in what kind of Bosnia they will live peacefully together. Bosniaks continue to desire a united Bosnia with equal rights for all (UNDP 2003). Croats would prefer to have their own separate entity and Serbs prefer to separate from Bosnia. Between 2000 and 2003, there was no increase in support for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state of equal citizens and peoples among Serbs and Croats (Graph 4), who continue to believe that a united Bosnia would in practice lead to Bosniak domination, rather than equal rights for all.

**Conclusions and implications**

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36 The question wording is slightly different in 1995 and 2001. In 1995, respondents were asked whether they “believe the Croats Muslims, and Serbs can live peacefully together in the country” (Sweeney 1999b). In 2001, respondents were asked if they believe “in time, Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims will be able to live peacefully together again.” Between 1-9 percent of the respondents chose “don’t know.”
Since the signing of Dayton, grassroots trends in attitudes about, and experiences with, those ethnically different indicate increasing support for coexistence. These positive trends have occurred even among groups who have expressed the most ethnocentric attitudes. That they have largely been sustained amidst significant levels of minority return is important for the sustainability of the returns. Analysis of data culled from numerous sources suggests that this improvement in grassroots-level interethnic relations requires space for safe interethnic interaction and for the practicalities of having to interact with people of different social backgrounds in everyday life to take precedence. The quality of interethnic relations in Bosnia—as elsewhere—will vary according to local demographic, social, economic, and political contexts. Nonetheless, Bosnian Serbs in the RS express only modest levels of support for coexistence, which requires mutual acceptance. Increasing the support for coexistence among Bosnian Serbs who reside in the RS will take additional time and a concerted effort by international officials and domestic elites to constructively engage them. In addition, ordinary people are far from being fully re-integrated, especially minority returnees, displaced persons, victims of wartime atrocities, female heads of household, people of “mixed” background, and the unemployed (UNHCR 2005).

In the past several decades, grassroots attitudes and experiences in the former Yugoslav region have been more tolerant than elite attitudes and experiences. While popular attitudes many not be the most important obstacle to coexistence, they do affect the ability of elites to mobilize them for ethnonationalist goals. A key problem for reconstruction in Bosnia is the lack of strong midlevel organizations with popular roots—broad-based voluntary organizations and political parties organized by grassroots efforts—to work to frame popular concerns about the economy and corruption in a utilitarian way, rather than through ethnic prisms. In the current environment, it will be very difficult to break constraints on moderate forces imposed by Dayton’s political institutions and entrenched ethnonationalist patronage networks. For example, ordinary people’s deep concerns about the economic situation and their willingness to share the workplace with persons of other backgrounds call for greater international effort at creating jobs beyond the grip of nationalist parties. Statistical models explaining intolerance suggest that strategies for improving interethnic relations at the grassroots level require attention to social divisions along generational and rural-urban lines. Almost sole focus on ethnic divisions misinterprets the complex dynamics of social relations in Bosnia.
This paper raises other issues that deserve further research. One is investigating whether attitudes about the willingness of Bosnians to coexist with those ethnically different varies according to the local demographic balance, which has been recently altered by minority returns. Further research should uncover how much election campaigns and victories of parties with more ethnocentric platforms influence local perceptions of interethnic relations.\textsuperscript{37} Evaluation of Bosnia’s progress in accommodating difference requires investigating how social cleavages beyond ethnic ones interact to influence social and political reconstruction. Additional systematic participant observation in different types of communities is needed to help identify mechanisms that ordinary people find useful for negotiating across a complex set of post-war social cleavages. Understanding the concerns of youth and making efforts to address them is of vital importance to a stable and inclusive reconstruction process.

\textsuperscript{37} UNHCR (2005) suggests that incidents against minority returnees escalate during election campaigns, while UNDP (2003) suggests that the return to power of nationalist parties in 2002 worked to sour subsequent interethnic relations.
Appendix A

Coding of Variables Used in the Models to Predict Religious Intolerance (Table 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE:</th>
<th>CODING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious intolerance</td>
<td>1=if respondent mentioned unwillingness to live next to a neighbor of a different religion; 0=if respondent did not mention an unwillingness to live next to someone of a different religion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of an NGO (not religious)</td>
<td>1= if respondent reported membership in 1 or more of the following voluntary organizations: political parties, sports, arts, labor unions, environmental, heath, professional, youth, service for elderly, charity, local, human rights, peace, other; 0=if respondent did not belong to one of the above voluntary organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
<td>1=never, 2=rarely, 3=attend on holy days, 4=attend once a month, 5=attend once a week, 6=attend more than once a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of the communist system</td>
<td>A scale of views of the former communist political system: Ranges from very bad =1 to very good=10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic identification</td>
<td>1=if described self as foremost a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina; 0=if describe self as foremost a member of a particular ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Cohort</td>
<td>1=if between 18-24; 2=if 25-34; 3=35-44; 4=45-54; 5=55-64; 7=if 65 years old or older</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban resident</td>
<td>1=if resident in a town under 2,000, 2=if resident of a town between 2,000-5,000; 3=if between 5-10,000; 4 if 10-20,000; 5=20-50,000; 6=50-100,000; 7=100-500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1=no education; 2=incomplete primary; 3=complete primary; 4=incomplete secondary technical; 5=complete secondary technical; 6=incomplete secondary university-prep; 7=complete secondary university prep; 8=some university education; 9=complete university degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Increasing scale of monthly income before taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1=if respondent is unemployed; 0=if not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1=if male; 0=if female;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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